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MATH MODELING IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: AN APPROACH
TO METHODOLOGICAL FALLACIES
Bakhtiar shabani Varaki
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran
Lorna Earl
OISE/ University of Toronto, Canada
whether a distortion occurs when
educationalists utilize to math modeling?
ABSTRACT
Math modeling is currently at the focus
of educational methodologists'
attention. However, little is known about
the extent to which principles of the
math modeling lead to methodological
fallacies in educational research. The
main purpose of this paper is to explore
the nature and principles of math
modeling and to examine its application
in educational research according to
transcendental realism theory. The
conclusion of the article suggests some
methodological fallacies in educational
research. Finally, the implications of the
fallacies in educational research are
considered.

INTRODUCTION
The fact that quantitative methods are
once again very evident in educational
research may lead one to conclude that the
quantitative/qualitative debate has been
settled in favor of the former. To some
extent, this is as a result of managerial
pressures and the need to produce research
findings that allow predictions to be made
by managers at both institutional and
systemic levels. It also reflects pressures
on educational researchers to mirror the
methods of the natural sciences and an
assumption that predictive, deterministic,
rational and impersonal knowledge is
possible in the educational sciences.
This orientation supposes that our failure
to solve many of the problems in society
reflects a lack of finesse with the method
rather than the application of a misguided
epistemology and ontology. In fact, there
is still a fundamental, enduring
controversy over the nature of educational
sciences. We want to take this occasion,
then, to reflect on whether in fact the
world can be known in this way. And
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There is a long-standing tension in the
educational sciences between two quite
distinct and opposed ideas about the nature
of educational life and the possibilities of
our knowledge of it. One of the views is
commitment to mathematics and the other
one is based on an interpretative approach
in which mathematical methods are
irrelevant in the study of educational
phenomena.
Our purpose in this article is to consider the
issues raised by this persistent division of
opinion, not with the intention of championing
one side or the other, but rather of showing
that the issue itself is misconceived and leads
to methodological fallacies. This paper focuses
on investigating the dominance of math
modeling in educational research through the
lens of transcendental realism. We identify
some challenges to the approach, the problems
of math modeling, and the relation between the
problems and methodological fallacies in
educational research.

NATURE OF MATH- MODELING IN
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Mathematical modelling is a technique for
understanding the dynamics of a system
and for predicting future outcomes within
the system. From a simplified perspective,
any system is composed of two
fundamental things: (1) elements that have
certain qualities and properties (2)
relationships and actions that explain how
these elements interact and change
(Norris, et al, 1997). Indeed, mathematical
models are an abstraction of the system
they represent. By using such models, the
user can study and understand the
relationships between the elements of the
system without having to actually
manipulate the system. Abstraction also
allows for the simplification of the system
because it is not necessary or even
desirable for it to be exact or replicate the
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exact mechanisms. Modelling is
representing the educational phenomenon
in mathematics terms giving meaning to
mathematical symbols, clarifying
understanding of mathematics ideas, and
doing mathematics. Mathematics can
replace direct interaction with the object
under study. The experience of the
phenomenon is transposed into mental
images in the memory of the learner and
can become associated with abstract
mathematic representations. One can
respond to the symbols without a model
but by using its mental images as referents
of thinking. Math models, as conceptual
models, consist of a collection of
principles or rules that describe the
behaviour of the system under
consideration. For example, representing
the shape of the earth as a sphere provides
a mathematical model, since the principles
involved are those of elementary
geometry. The active process of devising a
mathematical model is called
mathematical modelling (Breithach and
Maltas, 2003). Thus, mathematical
modelling is a systematic process that
draws on many skills and employs the
higher cognitive activities of
interpretation, analysis, and synthesis. The
modelling process is composed of five
main stages.
1. Observing a phenomenon, delineating
the problem situation inherent in the
phenomenon, and discerning the important
factors (variables/parameters) that affect
the problem.
2. Conjecturing the relationships among
factors and interpreting them
mathematically to obtain a model for the
phenomenon.
3. Applying mathematical analysis to the
model.
4. Obtaining results and reinterpreting
them in the context of the phenomenon
under study and drawing conclusions.
5. Testing and refinement of the model
(Breithach and Maltas, 2003).
So, mathematical models are underpinned
by a number of beliefs about the nature of
reality and how we can know it, which
immediately involves us in a
contradiction, since one of those assertions
is that such methods are not reflections of
underlying belief systems (Scott, 2000).
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However, this approach provides an
invaluable tool to scientists because they
can be easily manipulated and changed
when necessary.
There are two main approaches to
mathematical logic used by educational
methodologists (Scott, 2000; Edling,
2002):
APPROACHES
Deterministic Modelling
In the deterministic process, it is deemed
possible to determine a future state if we
know the current state of the process
through differential (or difference)
equations (Edling, 2002). These modelers
reduce aspects of human behavior to
variables, which are independent and
logically distinct. Educational life is
portrayed as consisting of a number of
instances of those variables, which are, for
the purpose of description, equivalent.
This equivalence operates across time and
place. The relationship between these
variables is causal and linear.
Furthermore, all educational phenomena
can be characterized in this way. So the
intentions, beliefs and reasons for action
by human beings are no different from
activities of chemicals. Antecedent
conditions are understood as efficient
causes of human behaviour. This means
that is possible to develop a science of
human behaviour, which allows
predictions to be made about what will
happen (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995 and
Scott, 2000).
STATISTICAL MANIPULATION/
STOCHASTIC MODELS
In the stochastic model the future state can
only be predicted from the present with
some probability (Edling, 2002). This
approach works on the basis of fuzzy
logic, and describes a system that it is not
determinate as such because built into it is
a notion of probability, which allows for
the possibility of counter-factual cases.
According to this approach, we may
sometimes be wrong about the nature of
the world, but this is caused by the bias of
researcher or observer when they fail to
bracket out their values, preconceptions
and experiences of the world or
inappropriately apply the method. Values
or preferences or choices do not play a
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significant part in either the activity of
human beings or their description by other
human beings. Furthermore, within the
limits of probability it is possible to
provide policy makers, administrators and
the like with information that they can
then confidently use to further their ends.
This argument, therefore, seems on the
surface to have provided us with a solution
to the problem of finding a means of
obtaining useful knowledge, while at the
same time accounting for a voluntaristic
dimension to human relations (Blossfeld
and Rohwer, 1995; Scott. 2000).
Historically, stochastic models have been
used more frequently than deterministic
ones in educational sciences. There are
several reasons for this:
One being educationalists in
general regard deterministic
models as suspect, another
that Coleman’s (1964)
textbook dealt with stochastic
process models. Third, with
stochastic process models,
change in discrete variables
can be modeled directly.
(Edling, 2002, 204)
However, this may present too simple a
view of explanation in educational
sciences, according to transcendental
realism.
MATH MODELING AND
TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM
Since Galileo, it has been understood that
there is an essential connection between
natural sciences and mathematics. Indeed,
the underlying concepts of natural
sciences can be formulated by
mathematics. Consequently, there is also
an insistence that the fundamental
propositions in educational sciences can
be formulated by mathematical methods.
Some educational methodologists even
claim this is no essential methodological
distinction between the natural and
educational sciences (Wilson, 1987). The
idea that the educational sciences should
model themselves on the natural sciences
circulated in a general way in the
Enlightenment and was formulated as an
explicit thesis by Auguste Comte and John
S. Mill. Since that time it has been the
orthodox methodological position in the
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humanities, particularly in educational
sciences (Wilson, 1987). However, there
has also been continuing disagreement
about the conception of educational
sciences as the natural sciences of
education (Giddens, 1976, 1979). One
important version of the opposition is
transcendental realism. According to
transcendental realism, we seek to
establish that the natural science model
can inappropriate and misleading in the
educational sciences and mathematics
cannot play the same fundamental role in
the study of educational environments as
in understanding natural phenomena.
Nevertheless, a purely ideographic
approach is also ineffective and
mathematics has an indispensable role to
play in unravelling the complexities of
educational phenomena. A strong
argument has been made by transcendental
realists that perception is theory- laden.
So, what an observer sees, and also what
he or she does not see, and the form that
the observation takes is influenced by the
background knowledge of the observer, of
theories, of hypotheses, of assumptions, or
of conceptual schemes that the observe
harbours (Phillips and Burbules, 2000).
The relativity of the light of reason is the
second of this issue. It means that what is
obvious to one person may not be obvious
to another. Consequently, it is so hardly a
solid basis on which to build a whole
edifice about knowledge. And the third
reason we can identify is the problem of
induction. This is the longest standing
issue for empiricists, with a lively history
of discussion going been about 250 years
to the work of David Hume. Hume's
sceptical question is; what observation
have we made that enable us to be certain
about as yet unobserved cases? This
question has rung out through the years.
So, philosophers of science and logicians
have been much exercised to find a
solution. Some, like Popper, have denied
that inductive reasoning is important in
science. In fact, Popper denied that it
exists at all. Indeed, these are a part of the
main issues that are extremely
troublesome for foundationalism
(rationalism and positivism)
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SCIENTIFICIZABILITY OF
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Transcendental realists hold that much
educational research can be, and ought to
be, scientific. But we add the vital proviso
that this position is reasonable only if the
positivist account of the nature of science
prevalent in earlier times is replaced by a
more up-to-date postpositivist account.
Arguments for the disjunction of natural
science and social science have often
rested on an unrealistic account of the
nature of the natural sciences. If they are
viewed according to the positivist model
as based on fundamentalist assumptions
about evidence, proof, and trust, social
science does seem to be quite different.
However, when science is viewed
according to the post-positivist model, in
which observations are theory-laden, facts
underdetermine conclusions, value affect
choice of problems, and communities of
researchers must examine methods and
conclusions for bias, then the perceived
gap between social and nature sciences
begins to disappear (Philips and Burbules,
2000).
Nevertheless, there are some important
points that the educational researcher must
consider when he or she works as an
educational scientist. These points are
related to methodological fallacies
associated with math modelling in
educational research: (1) closed system
versus open system (2) association versus
causation and (3) intentionality versus
extensionality.
PROBLEMS OF MATH MODELLING
IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
There are three important issues regarding
math modeling in educational research
that need to be examined (Scott, 2000).
One of the most important problems
regarding math modeling in educational
research is relevance to the kind of
systems within which the educational
researcher actually operates. In other
words, there is a main distinction between
closed systems and open systems
(Bhaskar, 1991, Archer, 1995, Sayer,
1992). Closed systems operate in two
ways: (1) they operate consistently and (2)
the external conditions of causal
mechanism must remain constant to allow
them to operate. Thus it is possible to
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suggest that, when both of these
conditions hold, we can infer a causal
relation. Of course, there is a third
condition that lies in the realm of
epistemology, and this knows that the
causal relationship has not been
contaminated by faulty, inconsistent or
inadequate methods of data collection.
On the other hand, in open systems an
object has powers and capabilities that are
causally efficacious. These powers and
liabilities do not just reside in individual
human beings but also in the relation
between them and even in the structural
forms that they reproduce and change by
their voluntaristic actions. Human beings
do not operate in any deterministic way
and are activated by individuals and
groups of individuals creating the
conditions for them to do so. In other
words, educational researchers, in general,
operate with open systems in which the
two conditions of the closed system are
violated. Objects do not operate
consistently they change their essential
nature, and the external conditions for the
exercise of causality also change.
Therefore, it is likely that over time and in
different places, different manifestations
of causal powers are at work. Because the
constant conjunction of events that we
think we have observed is not what it
seems, educational researchers are clearly
operating within open systems.
The second problem lies in the
relationship between association and
causation. Associations are identified as
being between precisely defined variables.
These variables have to be operationalised
because they have to be understood and
expressed as observable phenomena. They
also cannot be singular because the
defining operation of which they are a part
involves the further identification of other
identifiable items, which are similar in all
essential respects. This is a necessary
reductive act in the process of
operationalising variables, which denies
the need for any interpretive activity
(Scott, 2000). Indeed, if we assume that
the world consists of constant
conjunctions of events, this inevitably
conflates association and causal relations.
For example, the relationship between two
variables in educational research, such as
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poverty and academic achievement, is
associational one. When researchers find a
relationship between them, it tells us little
about the causality, which produces the
associations. As Bhaskar (1979)
articulated in his discussion of
transcendental realism, those regularities
so produced do not relate in a
straightforward way to the causal
mechanism, which produced them. In
deed, those causal mechanisms may really
be in conflict with their appearances.
Therefore, theorists who operate in open
systems have to distinguish between
associational properties and causal
mechanisms. Those who operate in closed
system do not have to cope with this
problem.
The third issue is that because modelers
operate extensionally, the intentional
dimension of educational life is neglected.
Extentionalism is a term that comes from
the fact that standard logic satisfies the
principle of extensionality. In standard
logic, any expressions that are true of the
same object, i.e. having the same
extension can be substituted freely for one
another without changing the truth of the
larger context. Thus, standard logic deals
with the reference of an expression, what
it is true of, rather than with its meaning
(Wilson, 1987, 390). Behaviorism, for
example, seeks to eliminate any references
to beliefs, purpose and meaning. But,
educational sciences would embrace these
human traits and suggests that educational
researcher's descriptions of their
experiences; project and desire are not
purely epiphenomenal. Consequently,
first, as Wilson (1987, 398-9) articulates:
“It is crucially important to note
explicitly that use of a mathematical
model does not imply that descriptions are
untainted by intention. Rather, when we
develop and apply such a model we
arrange to package intentional idioms in
such a way that, for the purpose at hand,
we can proceed with formal calculations."
The second is that these educational actors
and the relation between them are reduced
to pale shadows of their real selves.
Structural properties are reified and the
voluntaristic dimension to educational life
is inadequately accounted for (Scott,
2000).
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PROBLEMS OF MATH MODELING
AS A MAIN REFERENCE FOR
RAISING METHODOLOGICAL
FALLACIES
Logically, we have identified that each
problem of application of the math
modeling in educational research could
result in some methodological fallacies as
follows. Closed systems can result in the
fallacy of homogeneity, reductive fallacy
and deterministic fallacy. Association is
the main reference of the causal fallacy
and prospective fallacy. Extensionality is
main reference of the fallacy of value-free
knowledge.
1. The fallacy of homogeneity: the
characteristics given to a group of people
are assumed to apply to individuals within
that group.
2. The causal fallacy: observed patterns of
behaviour are considered as caused
configurations.
3. The fallacy of value-free knowledge:
knowledge (educational science) is
thought as value-free. Therefore, the
researchers ignore the value-rich
dimension of their activity.
4. The prospective fallacy: Retrospective
viewpoints are frequently conflated with
prospective viewpoints. We may be able
to explain what has happened, but this
dose not means that we know what will
happen.
5. The reductive fallacy: Human
characteristics are reduced to variable,
which can not to be further reduced and
which when combined capture the essence
of either that human being or educational
activities which they are engaged in.
6. The deterministic fallacy: Researchers
neglect human intention and creativity in
their description of educational activities
(Scott, 2000).
CONCLUSION
The general purpose of this paper has been
to examine the transcendental realist
challenge to positivism in educational
research. In the most general terms,
positivism is an epistemology i.e. a theory
of knowledge, which holds that reality
exists and is driven by the law of cause
and effect and can be discovered through
empirical testing of hypotheses. Such
inquiry is empirically objective and value
free, as the laws or generalization exists
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independently of educational and
historical context. Today, positivism as a
concept, serves as much to fuel a polemic
as it does to identify a distinct
epistemological theory of movement.
Transcendental realism offers an
alternative view. It is grounded in the idea
that reality exists, but can never be fully
understood or explained, given both the
multiplicity of causes and effects and the
problem of social meaning. Objectivity
can serve as an ideal, but requires a critical
community of interpreters. Critical of
empiricism, it emphasizes the social
construction of theory and concepts
(Guba, 1990).
The particular purpose of the present paper
is to identify and to discuss major issues
involved in attempting to employ
mathematical models as tools in
educational research. With respect to
transcendental realism, we identified that
mathematical modelling is the
establishment of a simplified description
of some aspect of the real world. We also
note that each instance of modelling
involves a goal: the solution of some real
world problem. Nevertheless, as it was
articulated by Abelson (1995, 1):
The field of statistics is
misunderstood by students
and nonstudents alike. The
general public distrusts
statistics because media
manipulators often attempt to
gull them with misleading
statistical claims.
In our view, the description need only be a
sufficient approximation in context to
provide an adequately accurate answer.
This permits one to simplify the
description, omitting aspects of irrelevant
importance, so as to make the analysis and
computation feasible.
Further, we have tried to illustrate a
number of important points in relation to
the role of complexity in knowing the
educational world. Complexity denies the
possibility of complete representations,
and in this sense knowing the educational
world must not only involve abstraction
but it must also involve recognition that
the processes of abstraction involve
making selections. However, with
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complex situations, one can make
numerous selections; that are always
contingent.
We also identify that we, as educational
researchers, can imagine the thrill of
commanding new mathematical
methodology that lead to novel
perspectives. Math models are actually
one of the power tools for understanding
the intricacies of educational phenomena.
However, they cannot play the same role
as a vehicle for expressing fundamental
concepts and propositions in educational
sciences as they do in the natural sciences.
The reason for this is that educational
phenomena are inherently intentional and
educational researchers work in open
systems. Moreover, in educational
research it is possible that association is
not causality. Indeed, educational sciences
cannot insist on extensional descriptions
without abandoning their phenomena.
However, this does not mean that
mathematics has no place in educational
research. Mathematics can play a heuristic
rather than a fundamental role in research
on educational phenomena. Several points
are worth considering about the place of
math modelling in educational research;
(1) in using math model to represent
dimensions of an educational situation,
researchers gain the benefit of precise
formulation. However, they must be
sensitive when they are articulating the
model of the historical and institutional
context on which it is based. Otherwise
they risk serious error in specifying the
model and raising some methodological
fallacies. (2) A well-specified model can
identify the quantitative and categorical
data required to address the questions that
motivated the initial inquiry. However, if
the model is viewed as heuristic,
researchers are not so likely to miss the
wood for the trees, as when they mistake
the model for the whole story. (3) The line
between math models in some pure sense
and the use of math as an aid to data
analysis becomes blurred once all math
models in the educational sciences are
recognized as having primarily a heuristic
function. (4) Researchers must recognize
more consistently than is now generally
the case that the concepts and variables in
terms of which a model is formulated are
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based directly or indirectly on the
categories employed by the people being
studied to organize their activities for
themselves (Wilson, 1987 & Fischer,
1998). By considering these points and
their theoretical foundations in educational
research, the researchers are able to avoid
the typical methodological fallacies which
are associated with math modelling: the
fallacy of homogeneity, the causal fallacy,
the fallacy of value-free knowledge, the
prospective fallacy, the reductive fallacy
and the deterministic fallacy.
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